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1. INTRODUCTION 
"Information - unlike food, shelter, health, or energy, is not a primary factor 
to human survival. It is, however, necessary immediately after these basic factors 
"1 
Computers have become an integral part of modern industrial societies, 
utilized in almost every aspect of human endeavor.2 While the increased use of 
computers has extended the benefits of advanced technology to society,3 com-
puters have also created a new avenue for criminal activity.4 Crimes involvin'g the 
use of computers have increased at a substantial rate," prompting national 
debate over the need for specific legislation to combat this twentieth-century 
problem." 
Several factors, such as the growing availablility of personal computers7 and 
heightened computer literacy,S have contributed to the increase in computer-
related crime. Much of the increase, however, is due to advances in networking, 
a method of accessing computer systems via dial-in facilities. 9 With the use of a 
I. Hearings on S. 240 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 96th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 38 (1980) (statement of M. Dertouzos, Professor of Computer Science, M.I.T.) 
2. See Sokolik. Computer Crime - The Needfor Deterrent Legislation, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 353,355 (1980) 
(stressing that the computer has become the "workhorse" of data processing: "[s]ociety could not revert 
to the days of manual processing of information even if it wanted to do so"). 
3. Computer industry projections in the United States indicate that in the home market alone, over 
80 million personal computers will be in existence in 1990, as compared to only 5000 in 1978. 130 CONGo 
REC. H7631 (daily ed. July 24, 1984). 
4. A recent American Bar Association survey estimated losses due to computer crime as high as $730 
million annually in the United States. See H.R. Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1984) [hereinafter 
cited as House Report]. 
5. One computer expert estimates the number of computer-related crimes in the United States at 
over 200,000 yearly. See H.R. REP. No. 438, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1984). 
6. See Sokolik, supra note 2. Cf Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 COMPUTER L.J. 517 
(1979). 
7. In 1983, there were 7.9 million home and personal computers in the United States. Thornton,Age 
of Electronic Convenience Spawning Inventive Thiroes, Washington Post, May 20, 1984, cited in 129 CONGo 
REC. S6522 (daily ed. May 24, 1984). See also supra note 3. 
8. Computer terminals are a common feature in the classroom, even at the elementary school level. 
Thornton, supra note 7. 
9. House Report, supra note 4, at 10. 
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modem, a device which allows computers to "communicate" over telephone 
lines, home computers can be connected to computer systems worldwide. to 
Computer-related crime is often divided into four categories: introduction of 
fraudulent records or data into a computer; alteration or destruction of com-
puter data or files; theft of money, financial instruments, property, services, or 
valuable data; and unauthorized use of a computerY Canadian and U.S. media 
coverage of computer-related crimes has primarily focused on perpetrators of 
the fourth category of computer-related crime, the unauthorized users or "hac-
kers"12 who gain access to a computer system,13 often for the challenge of 
"breaking in."14 
In one illustrative incident,15 several youths in the United States used home 
computers to break into the computer files of a major cancer research center, 
where they altered patient records and radiation doses.1 6 This incident clearly 
demonstrates that unauthorized computer use is more than mere "intellectual 
pranksterism."17 The risks surrounding unauthorized computer use involve 
international concerns ranging from threats to national security IS to increasing 
monetary losses due to computer-related crime. 19 
In the United States, formal efforts to make computer-related crime a federal 
offense began in 1977, with the introduction of the Federal Computer Systems 
Protection Act. 20 Had the Act passed,21 it would have broadly prohibited any 
10. Id. See also Thornton, supra note 7. 
11. 125 CONGo REC. 1190, 1191 (1979). 
12. See, e.g., Thornton, "Hackers" Ignore Consequences of High-Tech Joyrides , Washington Post, May 21, 
1984, cited in 129 CONGo REC. S6524 (daily ed. May 24, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Thornton II]. The 
article mentions, for example, an incident where students at the Dalton school in Manhattan used their 
classroom computers to break into 21 computer systems in Canada. 
13. The U.S. General Accounting Office's definition of computer system is comprehensive, including 
not only computer hardware and computer programs (software), but also organizations and procedures 
for preparing input to the computer and using the output. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER-
RELATED CRIMES IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS, 1 (1976). 
14. The Criminal Justice Newsletter notes that "hacking" has become a familiar term to the criminal 
justice professional. The Newsletter defines "hacking" as cracking codes and breaking into computer 
systems, either "for mischief or malice". Crim. Just. Newsletter, June 20, 1983, at 4, col. 2. 
15. Thornton II, supra note 12, at S6524. 
16. /d. This incident was the impetus for H.R. 5831, Penalizing Unauthorized Direct Access to or 
Alteration of Individual Medical Records Through a Telecommunications Device. See H.R. REP. No. 
918, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1984). The bill failed to report out of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary. The bill has been reintroduced in the 99th Congress as H.R. 995. H.R. 995, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 131 CONGo REC. H328 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985). 
17. House Report, supra note 4, at 11. The House Report indicated that the U.S. public downplays 
the seriousness of computer-related crime, creating an "attitudinal problem" in preventing the offense. 
/d. at 12. 
18. In Canada, much of the media coverage on hacking has focused on the threat to national 
security. See Webber, Computer Crime or Jay-walking on the Electronic Highway, 1983 CRIM L. QTLY 217, 
218. 
19. See H.R. REp. No. 438, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1984) (citing estimates of losses due to 
computer-related crime as high as one billion dollars annually in the United States). 
20. 123 CONGo REc. 20,953 (1977). 
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fraudulent or intentional unauthorized use of a computer system.22 Until re-
cently, however, Congress has been hindered in its attempt to pass criminal 
legislation by disputes over the question of what constitutes a computer crime.23 
Congress now has chosen to define computer-related crime as specific acts, 
such as the gaining of access to a computer facility without authorization.24 In 
contrast, computer expert Donn Parker defines computer-related crimes by 
focusing on the role of the computer in a given crime.25 Computer expert John 
Taber argues that "computer crime," per se, does not exist.26 According to this 
view, the computer is merely a new tool for committing established crimes, such 
as embezzlement or theft. 27 
As a result of these varying viewpoints, strong disagreement exists over the 
need for legislation prohibiting computer usage for criminal purposes.28 Oppo-
nents of computer-specific legislation argue that traditional statutes, such as 
fraud or theft statutes, are adequate to secure convictions for crimes involving 
computers.29 Deputy District Attorney Donald Ingraham has argued that if 
computer crime legislation is enacted, it should clearly state that it does not 
pre-empt the use of other statutes which may be more appropriate for prosecu-
tion.30 Despite the disagreements, the 98th Congress, spurred on by dramatic 
increases in "hacker" incidents,3l enacted the nation's first federal computer 
crime legislation, The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1984.32 
21. The bill failed to report out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at the end of the second 
session. 
22. S. 1766, introduced by Senator Ribicoff in 123 CONGo REC. 10,790 (1977). 
23. See Hearings on H.R. 3970 (Federal Computer Systems Protection Act) Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 63, 64 (1982) 
(describing and criticizing existing computer crime definitions) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 
3970]. 
24. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
25. Hearings on H.R. 3970, supra note 23, at 46. (Statement of D. Parker). Parker identifies four 
possible roles that a computer could play in a computer-related crime. These include: 1) the computer 
as the object of a physical attack (e.g. vandalism); 2) the computer as a "unique form of assets subject to 
abusive acts" (e.g. programs); 3) the computer as an "instrument" or tool for planning a crime; 4) the 
computer as a symbol to intimidate or deceive (e.g. a fraudulent investment scheme involving a "secret 
computer program" guaranteed to predict stock market activity). 
26. Taber, supra note 6, at 518-26. 
27. [d. at 537. 
28. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
29. See Hearings on S. 240 Before the Subcomm. on Crimina/Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 240, 
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1,5-16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on S. 240]. 
30. Ingraham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER LJ. 429, 438 (1980). 
31. The increased number of "hacker" incidents is due to advances in computer networking. See 
supra notes 1O-11 and accompanying text. 
32. H.R. 5616 (as amended by H.J. Res. 648) became law on October 18, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
98 Stat. 2190-2193 (codified as The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 
1984 § 2102(a), 18 V.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1985». The Act is hereinafter cited as the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act. 
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In Part II of this Comment the author analyzes the approaches to computer-
related crime in Canada and England. Recent Canadian cases have characterized 
computer programs and information as "property."33 Using this expanded 
definition of "property," Canadian courts have dealt with computer-related 
crimes under traditional fraud or larceny statutes.34 In England, courts have 
broadly interpreted provisions of the Theft Act to prosecute computer-related 
crimes.3s Neither country has enacted computer crime legislation. In Part III the 
author summarizes the major provisions of the new U.S. Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, and discusses enforcement issues surrounding unauthorized access 
to computers and theft of computer software. The author compares the prosecu-
tion of computer-related crimes under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act with 
prosecution under other applicable statutes in the United States. Part IV of this 
Comment addresses the need for computer system security, in addition to 
criminal statutes, to deter computer-related crime. The Small Business Com-
puter Security and Education Act of 1984,36 recently enacted in the United 
States, encourages this preventive approach by enabling the Small Business 
Administration37 to disseminate information on management techniques and 
computer system security. In Part V, the author compares and contrasts the U.S., 
Canadian, and English approaches to computer-related crimes, focusing on the 
status of information within the definition of property for each country. The 
author concludes that a better understanding of the roles of information and 
technology is necessary as a basic weapon in combatting computer-related crime. 
II. COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME IN CANADA AND ENGLAND 
A. Canada 
As in the United States, an increasing number of "hacker" incidents has 
intensified the pressure for computer-related criminal legislation in Canada.3H 
Although Canada has yet to enact any national computer legislation, one re-
cently proposed bi1l39 would have expanded the definition of property to include 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 60-83. 
34. ld. 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 90-98. 
36. H.R. 3075 became law on July 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-362, 98 Stat. 431, 434 (codified as the 
Small Business Computer Security and Education Act of 1984, § § 3,4, 15 u.S.C.A. § § 633(b)(3)-(4) 
(West Supp. 1985)). 
37. The Small Business Administration was established in 1958 to further the congressional goals of 
aiding and counseling small business concerns. The operation of small business development centers is 
one function of the Small Business Administration. See 15 U.S.C. § § 631-649 (1982). 
38. See Webber, supra note 18. 
39. Bll C-667, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act in Respect of 
Computer Crime, 1st Sess., 32nd Legis!., Eliz. II, 1980-81-82, [hereinafter cited as Bill C-667J. 
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intangibles40 and would have created a new offense for tampering with a com-
puter.4! 
Much of the controversy over the need for computer crime legislation has 
resulted from the 1980 case of Regina v, McLaughlin,42 McLaughlin, a student at 
the University of Alberta, had gained access to university computer files without 
authorization, and obtained internal programs and data,43 In the Triai Divi-
sion,44 the Supreme Court of Alberta convicted McLaughlin of theft. 45 Expand-
ing § 287 of the Canadian Criminal Code,46 the court held that a computer was a 
telecommunications facility within the meaning of the statute.47 The Appellate 
Division subsequently reversed the holding ofthe Alberta Supreme Court, based 
on a strict interpretation of the statute.4S 
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the judgment of the Appellate 
Division.49 In a concurring opinion, Justice Estey reasoned that § 287 was 
directed primarily at broadcasting and telephone interception,50 and concluded 
that if Parliament had intended to have penal consequences for unauthorized 
computer use, it could have done so specifically by including the term "com-
puter" in a penal statute.5! He further stated that the Court would not interpret a 
statute directed at the communications industry as also intending to proscribe 
40, Bill C-667, supra note 39, would have amended the definition of "property" in § 385 to include 
"any computer software or program, or copy thereof, in any retrieval computer data or information 
produced and stored in a machine readable form by any means," 
41. Bill C-667, supra note 39, Section 387,1 (Mischief) provided that: 
Everyone commits mischief who wilfully (a) destroys or damages property; (b) renders prop-
erty dangerous, useless, inoperative or ineffective; (c) and without authorization, express or 
implied, destroys or damages a computer program or computer data or alters a computer 
program or data in a way that renders it useless or inoperative or diminishes its commercial or 
scientific value; (d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use, enjoyment or 
operation of property , 
42, 18 Criminal Reports [C.R,] 3d 339 (1980), 53 Canadian Criminal Cases [C,C.C,] 2d 417, One 
commentator believes that this decision is the single most important factor in the current computer 
crime controversy, See Webber, supra note 18, 
43, Regina v, Christensen, reported in 26(10) CHITTY'S L.J 348 (1978), (McLaughlin was convicted 
with two other students, Only McLaughlin appealed the conviction,) 
44, The court system in Canada is comprised of provincial and federal courts, The federal courts 
consist of a Trial and an Appellate Division, The Supreme Court of Canada hears appeals from both 
provincial and federal courts, 
45, 26(10) CHITTY'S LJ. at 353, 
46, Criminal Code, CAN, REV, STAT, 1970, ch, C-34, § 287(I)b (re-enacted 1974-75-76, ch, 93, § 23) 
reads as follows: "287(1) Everyone commits theft who fraudulently, maliciously, or without colour of 
right, , , (b) uses any telecommunication facility or obtains any telecommunication service," Subsection 
(2) (re-enacted 1974-75-76, ch, 93, § 23) defines "telecommunication" as "any transmission, emission or 
reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by radio, visual, 
electronic or other electromagnetic system," 
47, 26(10) CHITTY'S LJ, at 350, 
48, 12 C,R, 3d 391 (1979), 
49, 18 C,R, 3d 339, 
50, 18 C,R, 3d at 345-349 (Estey, J., concurring opinion), 
51. ld, at 349, 
556 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
the unauthorized operation of a computer, and indicated that such change 
should come from the legislative branchY 
Even though the McLaughlin case rendered § 287 inapplicable to unau-
thorized access to a computer, other Canadian statutes have allowed convictions 
for such crimes. 53 In Regina v. Marine Resource Analysts Ltd. ,54 the defendant used 
a password belonging to his previous employer, the Department of Fisheries, to 
gain access to the computer facility of the University of New Brunswick.55 Based 
on the password, the University billed the Government of Canada for the 
computer time.56 Cleared of the charge under § 287,57 the defendant was con-
victed under § 42ps of attempting to defraud the government.59 
In the 1982 case of Regina v. Stewart,60 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
copying a confidential list of hotel union employees from a computer printout 
constituted theft of property. 61 Under § 283(1)d of the Canadian Criminal Code, 
theft includes converting property with intent to use it in such a way that it 
cannot be restored to the owner in its original condition.62 
Reversing a dismissal by the trial court,63 the Court of Appeal first determined 
that confidential information acquired by a commercial enterprise through an 
expenditure of labor and money constituted property under § 283.64 Reasoning 
that when confidential property is copied it loses its value to the owner, the court 
found the requisite intent under § 283(1)d.65 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Lacourciere argued that the extension of the 
concept of "property" to include information is a task reserved for the legis la-
52. Id. 
53. See, e.g., text of § 283(d)1 infra note 62. 
54. 421 N.S.R. 2d 631 (1980). 
55. /d. at 633. 
56. Id. 
57. /d. at 636-640. The Nova Scotia County Court in Marine Resources reached the same conclusion 
as the Supreme Court of Canada in McLaughlin, which had not yet been decided. 
58. Martin's Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. 1970, ch. C-34, § 421(c). 
59. 421 N.S.R. at 640. 
60. 42 Ont. 2d 225 (1983). 
61. Id. at 239-240. 
62. Section 283(1) reads: 
Everyone commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently 
and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything 
whether animate or inanimate, with intent. .. (d) to deal with it in such a matter that it can not be 
restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted. 
Martin's Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. 1970, ch. c-34, § 283(1). 
63. 38 Onto 2d 84 (1982). 
64. 42 Onto 2d at 236, 237. In a concurring opinion, Justice Cory argued that the Copyright Act 
automatically confers the right of copyright on this information, and that this right of copyright is 
"property" under § 283. Id. at 244-45. 
65. Id. at 239. See text of § 283(I)d, supra note 62. In the majority opinion, Justice Houlden noted that 
based on this reasoning, McLaughlin could have been convicted under § 283, had he been so charged. 
42 Ont. 2d at 239. 
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ture. 66 The Justice noted that proposed amendments to § 283 of the Criminal 
Code would specifically include computer programs and data in the definition of 
property.67 His dissent asserts that the judiciary is not the appropriate forum in 
which to expand the definition of property.68 Reiterating the reasoning of the 
trial court, Justice Lacourciere stressed that if the current interpretation of 
property was not adequate for the needs of modern Canadian society, "the 
remedy must be a change in the law by Parliament."69 His dissent reflects a 
growing concern with the necessity of expanding traditional property concepts. 70 
In the most recent Canadian case involving computer-related crime, Turner 
and the Queen, 71 the Ontario High Court reconciled the absence of Parliamentary 
action with judicial expansion of the definition of property.72 In Turner, the 
defendants had accessed computer tapes and tampered with the program stored 
on the tapes so that other users were unable to use the program without first 
obtaining the new program code. 73 The Turner court, in order to affirm a 
conviction under § 387, the mischief offense,74 had to find an interference with 
the use or operation of "property". 75 
Urging strict statutory interpretation, the defendants argued that the mischief 
offense, as currently enacted, did not prohibit the alteration of electronic data. 76 
Although admitting to altering the data, the defendants denied any interference 
with "property," reasoning that the computer tape itself was not physically 
damaged, and was still usable as a storage tape. 77 Pointing to proposed amend-
ments which would specifically prohibit the alteration of data,18 the defendants 
66. /d. at 235. 
67. /d. at 230. See Bill C-667, supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
68. 42 Onto 2d at 230, 235. 
69. /d. at 230 (quoting Keever, j., in Regina V. Stewart, 38 Onto 2d 84, 95 (1982)). 
70. A similar concern exists in the United States. Commenting on the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, Congressman Rodino stated that "[fJederallaw must keep pace with technology. It is as important 
today to develop Federal protection for intangible property such as information ... as it was to develop 
Federal law to protect tangible assets in interstate commerce in the past." 130 CONGo REC. H7635 (daily 
ed. July 24, 1984). 
71. 13 e.e.C. 3d 430 (1984). 
72. Id. at 434. 
73. Id. at 431. 
74: In pertinent part, § 387(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides that "[elvery one commits 
mischief who wilfully ... (d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use, 
enjoyment or operation of property." 
75. 13 C.C.C. 3d at 433. Under § 385, the applicable definition section for the mischief offense, 
"property" is defined as "real or personal corporeal property." Section 385 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code. 
76. 13 e.C.C. 3d. at 433. 
77. /d. at 433-34. 
78. Bill C-19, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 32nd-33d Legis!., Eliz. II, 1983-84, proposed 
enactment of new subsection 387( 1.1) provided that: 
Everyone commits mischief who wilfully (a) destroys or alters data; (b) renders data meaning-
less, useless or ineffective; (c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use of data; or, 
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argued that the amendments clearly indicated Parliament had not intended for 
the current mischief offense to apply to alteration of data. 79 
Rejecting this argument, the Turner court held that interference with the 
enjoyment of property was the essence of the mischief offense.8o The Turner 
court found that the defendants, by their actions, had interfered with the 
retrieval of data off the tape, making it impossible for other users to process their 
work. 8l The court referred to the definition of property as interpreted by the 
Stewart court,82 and concluded that the Parliamentary intent, as indicated by the 
proposed amendments, was not to alter § 387, as urged, but rather to clarify the 
existing law. s3 If the Turner case is followed, Canadian courts will treat alteration 
or destruction of computer data specifically as an interference with property. 
B. England 
England has also been plagued by the problem of whether intangibles such as 
information should be considered property. The leading case in this area is 
Oxford v. Moss,84 in which a student obtained a paper copy of examination 
questions, read the questions and returned the paper. So The Oxford court held 
that the abstraction of confidential information was not theft of intangible 
property for purposes of the Theft Act 1968.s6 
Several commentators have argued that this holding should not extend to 
information stored in a computer, as this information deserves the protection of 
criminallaw.87 English courts dealing with computer-related crimes have neatly 
skirted the information debate by framing the computer's role in a crime in 
terms of its use as a new tool or method for accomplishing an established crime. s8 
Indeed, whenever possible, English courts have analogized computer-related 
crimes to more recognizable fact patterns. 89 In this way, the courts also avoid 
entanglement in such issues as unauthorized access. 
/d. 
The 1984 case of Regina v. Thompson ,gO vividly illustrates the English approach 
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use of data or denies access 
to data to any person who IS entitled to access thereto. 
79. 13 C.C.C. 3d at 433. 
80. Id. at 434. 
81. /d. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65. 
83. 13 C.C.C. 3d at 434. 
84. 68 Crim. App. 183 (1978). 
85. Id. at 185. 
86. /d. at 185-86. 
87. See, e.g., Tettenborn, Stealing Injormation, 129 NEW L.J. 967 (1979); C. TAPPER, COMPUTER LAW 
216 (3d ed. 1983). 
88. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
89. Id. 
90. [1984] I W.L.R. 962. 
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to computer-related crime. Thompson, a computer operator, had entered dor-
mant bank account files, recorded withdrawals, and credited his own account 
with the money.9! The transfers had occurred in the computer files of a bank in 
Kuwait. 92 Thompson was apprehended in England while attempting to have the 
money sent to a local bank.93 Affirming Thompson's conviction of theft,94 the 
Leed's Court of Appeal stated: 
Discard for the moment the modern sophistication of computers and 
programmes and consider the old days when bank books were kept 
in manuscript in large ledgers. In effect all that was done by the 
appellant was to take a pen and debit each of the five accounts in the 
ledger with the relevant sums and then credit each of his own five 
savings accounts in the ledger with corresponding amounts. 9, 
Another English Court of Appeal had used similar reasoning in the 1981 case 
of Regina v. Davies & Nocross.96 Nocross, a brewery employee, had deleted orders 
on computer files so that Davies received beer without being billed.97 The court 
stated that it was unnecessary to determine the details or technicalities of how the 
fraud was accomplished, noting simply that the result of the activity was non-
payment for deliveries. 98 
The English courts' expanded use of existing laws has helped combat at least 
those computer-related crimes which end in accomplishing traditional crimes, 
such as conversion and fraud. The courts' focus on the results of computer-
related crimes has allowed English courts to prosecute such crimes without resort 
to specific computer crime legislation. Computer-related crimes such as the theft 
of computer programs, however, are not so easily adapted to prosecution under 
existing laws. 
Although the theft of information is not specifically prohibited under English 
law,99 Professor Tettenborn of the University of Nottingham has argued that the 
offense of obtaining a service or "benefit" by deception is applicable to the theft 
91. [d. at 964. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. Thompson was convicted under § 15 of the Theft Act of 1968, which states: 
(1) A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains property belonging to another, with the 
intention of permanently depriving the other of it .... (2) For purposes of this section a person 
is to be treated as obtaining property if he obtains ownership, possession or control of it, and 
'obtain' includes obtaining for another or enabling another to obtain or to retain. 
Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, § 15(1). Section 4(1) of the Theft Act defines "property" as "money and all 
other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property." Theft Act, 
1968, ch. 60, § 4(1). 
95. 1 W.L.R. at 967. 
96. C. A. (Crim.Div.) No. 90/Cl/80, (1981) (available Nov. 21,1984, on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases 
file). The defendants had appealed to reduce their sentences on their conviction for fraud. 
97. /d. 
98. /d. 
99. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. 
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of computer data or programs. IOO By equating "information" with "benefit", 
Tettenborn reasoned,lO[ obtaining information by deception is within the defini-
tion of the offense. [02 The utility of the statute is limited, however, to situations 
where the "benefit" is provided with the expectation of payment. [03 This addi-
tional requirement effectively precludes conviction of theft for the majority of 
computer programs which are generally not offered for sale. [04 
The absence of computer crime legislation may be due to efforts ofthe English 
Law Commission, whose function it is to review various areas of the law and 
propose developments or reform. [05 In a 1974 report, the Law Commission 
concluded that various provisions of the Theft Act are applicable to misuse of a 
computer to secure money or goods, associated schemes to defraud, and false 
accounting. !Os This expansive interpretation of existing provisions in the Theft 
Act has allowed prosecutors to treat as immaterial the fact that the defendant 
used computer technology to accomplish the crime. 
Both English and Canadian courts to date have successfully prosecuted 
computer-related crimes without resort to computer crime legislation by broadly 
interpreting existing statutes. By contrast, the United States has recently chosen 
to enact specific computer crime legislation. 
III. COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
In an attempt to alleviate some of the problems in prosecuting computer-
related crimes in the United States,[07 and to deter the increasing number of 
100. See Tettenborn, supra note 87. Section I of the Theft Act 1978 states: 
(I) A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains services from another shall be guilty of 
an offense. (2) It is an obtaining of services where the other is induced to confer a benefit by 
doing some act, or causing or permitting some act to be done, on the understanding that the 
benefit has been or will be paid for. 
Theft Act, 1978, ch. 31, § I. 
101. See Tettenborn, supra note 87, at 967. 
102. [d. 
103. See text of § 1(2) of the Theft Act, 1978, supra note 100. 
104. Tettenborn, supra note 87, at 967. 
105. The Law Commissions Act, 1965 states: 
lilt shall be the duty of each of the Commissions to take and keep under review all the law with 
which they are respectively concerned with a view to its systematic development and reform, 
including in particular the codification of such law, the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of 
obsolete and unnecessary enactments, the reduction of the number of separate enactments and 
generally the simplification and modernisation of the law. 
Law Commissions Act, 1965, ch. 22, § 3(1). Recommendations by the Law Committees often result in 
legislation. See WALKER, THE EN GUSH LEGAL SYSTEM 94-95 (2nd ed. 1970). 
106. LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPER 56, CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD (1974) ~ ~ 63, 64. 
107. See House Report, supra note 4, at 9, 10. The report states that one obstacle to prosecution is that 
much of the property involved in computer crimes, such as programs and data, does not fit within the 
definitions of property in traditional theft and larceny statutes. But cf infra text accompanying notes 
187-190. 
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incidents of unauthorized access by hackers, lOS Congress enacted the Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act).109 This section analyzes the major provisions of the Act, and 
assesses its potential effectiveness for prosecuting computer-related crimes. 
A. The Definition and Scope of Criminal Acts Under the Computer Fraud and A.buse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act defines criminal acts of computer usage 
and provides sanctions for fraudulent or related activity in connection with 
computers. IIO Towards this end, the Act delineates three categories of unau-
thorized access lll to computers. The first of these prohibited activities is any 
unauthorized access to obtain classified information 112 with the intent to use such 
information either against the United States or to the advantage of another 
nation. The Act defines such unauthorized access as a felony.1I3 
The Act defines the two other categories of offenses as misdemeanors. 114 The 
first of these lesser offenses is the unauthorized access by computer to informa-
tion prote<':ted by either the Right to Financial Privacy Act 115 or the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act. 116 The other lesser offense only refers to computers used for or 
on behalf of the U.S. government, and involves unauthorized access which 
results in the use, modification, destruction, or disclosure of information in the 
108. House Report, supra note 4, at 4-5. The Committee on the Judiciary was concerned with the 
lenient public attitude towards the white collar nature of computer-related crime. The committee 
reasoned that criminal legislation would be a deterrent, and would provide the necessary guidelines for 
proscribed activity in this area. 
109. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1985). 
110. Id. 
III. As used in this article, the phrase "unauthorized access" encompasses the following language in 
the statute: "accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with authoriza-
tion, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not 
extend .... " 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(I)-(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
Id. 
112. 18 U.S.C.A. § I 030(a)( I) (West Supp. 1985) defines classified information as 
information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an 
Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of 
national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph r. of § II 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . 
113. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1985). The felony provides for a fine of up to $10,000 
(or twice the value obtained) or for imprisonment up to ten years. Id. 
114. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). The misdemeanors provide for a fine of up to 
$5000 (or twice the value obtained) or for imprisonment up to one year. Id. 
115. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. (1982). 
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1982). 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985) defines protected 
information as 
Id. 
information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, as such terms are defined 
in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.), or contained in a file of 
a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (15 U.s.C. § 1681 et seq.). 
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computer. I 17 This offense also involves any unauthorized access which would 
prevent the authorized use of a government computer." H 
In this last offense, the provisions relating to unauthorized use or disclosure of 
government information have already received much criticism, and may not be 
retained. Jerry Berman of the American Civil Liberties Union immediately 
attacked this portion of the Act, characterizing it as tantamount to a "govern-
ment secrecy" law."9 Senator Mathias has argued that this section is, in effect, a 
broad anti-disclosure statute, prohibiting disclosure of information even when 
disclosure is mandated under the Freedom of Information Act. 120 To reconcile 
this discrepancy, the Senator has proposed an amendment which will narrow the 
scope of the anti-disclosure provision to information protected by the Privacy 
ActYI If such an amendment is not adopted by the 99th Congress, U.S. courts 
may soon be faced with the difficult task of integrating two statutes with conflict-
ing aims.122 
Commentators have severely criticized previous computer crime bills for their 
failure to distinguish between unauthorized access for criminal purposes, such as 
fraud, and unauthorized access for personal work or frolic, such as game play-
ing. 123 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has made this distinction. The Act 
specifically excludes from its coverage computer-related activities which exceed 
the scope of authorization, but result only in the use of computer time. 124 An 
example of excluded activity is the unauthorized use of a government computer 
by an employee to play games or to do homework. 125 Such an activity is generally 
117. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
118. Id. 
119.42(42) CONGo Q. 2752 (1984). 
120. 130 CONGo REC. SI4490 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). The Freedom of Information Act is codified at 
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). 
121. Senate bill S.610, which narrows this provision, was introduced by Senator Mathias on March 7, 
1985. S.61O, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONGo REC. S2727 (daily ed. Mar. 7,1985). Senator Mathias had 
proposed a similar amendment prior to enactment of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 130 CONGo 
REC. 14,445 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). This amendment passed in the senate but was rejected by the 
House of Representatives. The Privacy Act is codified at 5 U .S.C. § 552a (1982). 
122. In a similar vein, Colin Tapper notes that the conflicting overlap of information covered under 
the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). and the Privacy Act, 5 U.s.c. § 552a (1982), has 
yet to be judicially defined. He suggests that this task will provide "a difficult and fertile new field for 
litigation." TAPPER, supra note 87. at Ill. 
123. See. e.g., Taber, supra note 6, at 530-32; Comment. Legislative Issues in Computer Crime, 21 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 239. 252-253 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Issues). 
Id. 
124. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (West Supp. 1985) provides that 
lilt is not an offense under paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection in the case of a person having 
accessed a computer with authorization and using the opportunity such access provides for 
purposes to which such access does not extend, if the using of such opportunity consists only of 
the use of the computer. 
125. See House Report, supra note 4. at 22. 
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considered to be "time stealing," and Congress intended it to be handled at the 
administrative level. 126 
In effect, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act establishes a new category of 
crime where the use of a computer for criminal purposes is the criminal activity. 
This aspect of computer-specific legislation has not gone uncriticized. Senator 
Laxalt analogized the function of a computer to that of a filing cabinet and 
queried, "why should someone be treated differently for stealing information 
out of a filing cabinet than a person who takes the same information from a 
computer?"127 Congress has chosen, however, to treat the computerized form of 
information storage as a distinct kind of activity, 128 in order to regulate its newly 
discovered uses and abuses. 
At present, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act regulates unauthorized access 
to government computers. 129 For private computer systems, coverage under the 
Act extends only to those computers which contain certain financial or credit 
records, or information necessary to national security. 130 Previous attempts at 
computer crime legislation would have regulated unauthorized access not only to 
government computers, but to any computer used by an entity operating in or 
affecting interstate commerce. 131 An earlier version of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act also followed this approach. 132 Two proposed provisions from this 
early version would have extended coverage to all computer systems when the 
unauthorized access resulted in a loss of over $5000. 133 Congress withdrew these 
provisions from the enacted version of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 134 
and as a result, the prosecution of most computer-related crimes committed on 
private computer systems must proceed under other federal or state statutes. 
B. Enforcement Issues Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Other Statutes 
1. Supplementary Federal Statutes 
Although the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act specifically addresses 
computer-related crimes, it is unclear whether existing statutes which allow 
prosecution based on the underlying crime may not be as effective. For prosecu-
126. /d. 
127. Hearing on S. 240, supra note 29, at 4. 
128. One commentator suggests that prohibiting unauthorized access to a computer is equivalent to 
criminalizing unauthorized entrance into a records storeroom. Legislative Issues, supra note 123, at 252. 
129. 18 V.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
130. 18 V.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(I)-(2) (West Supp. 1985). 
131. See, e.g., S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Comment-
ing on S. 240, John Taber criticized the regulation of unauthorized access in private computer systems 
as an improper intrusion into employer,,'mployee relations. Taber, supra note 6, at 531. 
132. House Report, supra note 4, at 2-5. 
133. Id. 
134. H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984). 
564 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
tion of computer-related crimes excluded from coverage under the Act, such as 
theft of computer time or unauthorized access to a private computer, the use of 
alternate statutes becomes essential. In recent years, federal prosecutors have 
applied over forty statutes to the prosecution of crimes involving computers. 135 
The most commonly utilized statutes have been the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes,136 and the federal theft statute. 137 
Prior to the passage of the Act, several commentators had expressed concern 
that federal prosecutors were being forced to "shoe horn" computer-related 
offenses into existing statutes. 138 Prosecutors were faced with the choice of 
drafting pleadings for statutes not originally designed to encompass computer-
related activities, or allowing the activity to go unchallenged. 139 In an address to 
Congress, John Keeney of the Department of Justice cited United States v. Seid-
litz 140 as illustrative of this dilemma. 141 
In Seidlitz, the defendant used his office computer terminal in Virginia to 
fraudulently obtain software belonging to his previous employer, the Federal 
Energy Administration. 142 The fact that two of the calls were made across state 
lines provided the only basis for federal jurisdiction under the wire fraud 
statute. 143 Had the activities been within a single state, Seidlitz could not have 
been convicted. 144 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, on the other hand, does provide an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction in such a case, since Seidlitz accessed a 
government computer without authorization. 145 The penalties vary, however, 
between the two statutes. Under the new Act, the prosecutor is limited to seeking 
a one year imprisonment,146 in contrast to the five year sentence available under 
the wire fraud statute. 147 If a prosecutor instead attempts to seek a higher fine 
135. See Hearing on S. 240, supra note 29, at I. 
136. 18 U.S.C. § § 1341, 1343 (1982). 
137. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982). 
138. See, e.g., Sokolik, supra note 2, at 373; Note, Computer Abuse: The Emerging Crime and the Need 
for Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 78 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Computer Abuse). 
139. Computer Abuse, supra note 138, at 78, n. 36. 
140. 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 922 (1979). Seidlitz was convicted under two 
counts of the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). [d. at 153. 
141. House Report, supra note 4, at 6. 
142. 589 F.2d at 154, 155. Standard communications software packages enable computers to trans-
mit and receive data and programs over telephone lines by the use of electronic signals. 
[d. 
143. House Report, supra note 4, at 6. 
144. [d. 
145. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
146. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). 
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communi-
cation in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for 
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
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under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, he or she must consider the value 
the defendant obtained from the offense. For example, Seidlitz would have to 
have obtained a total value of over $2500 from the offense in order to increase 
the $5000 penalty set by the Act. 14H In addition, the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act is silent on whether the value of the use of computer time is included in 
calculating the total value obtained by the defendant from the commission of the 
crime. 149 
2. The Valuation of Computer Programs or Data 
Where an offense consists essentially of the "theft" of programs or data, courts 
may face the thorny problem of determining the value of programs or data. This 
determination would be necessary in order to impose a stiffer penalty than the 
set fine or relatively short prison sentence provided for under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act. 150 Although the Seidlitz court found that the transmitted 
data constituted "property" for purposes of the wire fraud statute,lol it did not 
attempt to place a dollar value on the programs stolen, nor was it necessary to do 
so to determine an appropriate penalty. 152 
Although the Supreme Court of Alabama has allowed the use of development 
costs to determine the value of computer programs/ 53 in other cases, the valua-
tion of programs or data may be futile. One state court has held that when 
software such as a computer program has no predetermined market value, the 
preferred method of valuation is the use of actual value. 154 In that case, the 
software was obtained from a university computer in the form of computer 
printouts, and the printouts were assigned an actual value as scrap paper. 100 
Given the problem of valuation under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
federal prosecutors facing a "theft" of programs may be able to obtain more 
148. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985) specifies that the maximum fine is the greater of 
$5000 or twice the value obtained by the offense. These fines may be increased in 1986 in accordance 
with the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 
149. An early draft of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act included a provision which specifically 
excluded the value of the use of computer time from the calculation of value obtained by the offense. 
See House Report, supra note 4, at 2-3. It is not yet known whether the final enactment of the law will be 
interpreted in a similar manner. 
150. It should be noted, however, that one purpose of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was to 
avoid entangling courts in the issue of whether intangible property, such as a computer program, could 
be "stolen" when the owner remains in possession of the original. See House Report, supra note 4, at 9. 
151. 589 F.2d at 160. 
152. There are no dollar loss thresholds for the calculations of penalties under the mail fraud statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) or wire fraud statute, 18 U.s.C. § 1343 (1982). 
153. National Surety Corp. v. Applied Systems, 418 So.2d 847, 850 (Ala. 1982). 
154. Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 692, 232 S.E. 2d 745, 748 (1977). See infra notes 159-61 
and accompanying text. 
155. 217 Va. at 692. 
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appropriate penalties under a potentially applicable copyright, patent, or trade 
secret statute. 156 
3. Prosecuting the Theft of Computer Time 
Where an offense consists of the "theft" of computer time, prosecution may 
not be possible under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The legislative 
history of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act suggests that Congress intended 
the theft of computer time from private computers to be prosecuted under state 
or locallaw. 157 Prosecuting the theft of computer time, however, has confounded 
many state courts. 158 The Virginia case of Lund v. Commonwealth 159 illustrates this 
problem. 
In Lund, the defendant had used over $26,000 in computer time. 160 The 
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed his conviction based on a strict interpreta-
tion of the state larceny statute, which did not include services as a proper object 
of larceny.161 Although Virginia subsequently amended its larceny statute to 
include computer services,162 many other states without such legislation are still 
unable to secure convictions for the theft of computer time. 
Successful prosecution may not be possible even when a state larceny statute 
includes the theft: of services. In People v. Weg,l63 the court held that New York's 
larceny statute, which included theft: of services,164 did not apply to the unau-
thorized use of an employer's computer. 165 The Weg court held that the theft of 
services applied only to services offered for sale, and did not apply to internal 
abuse of equipment. 166 
At the federal level, the theft of computer time from a private employer has 
156. An analysis of the legal remedies provided by copyright, patent, and trade secret law is beyond 
the scope of this article. For an excellent introduction into this area, see Davidson, Protecting Computer 
Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 JURIMETRICS J. 337. 
157. See House Report, supra note 4, at 22. 
158. See text accompanying notes 159-66 infra. 
159. 217 Va. 688. 
160. /d. at 690. The computer used by the defendant was leased on an annual basis from IBM. The 
value of the computer time used was determined based on the rental cost. [d. at 689. 
161. /d. at 691-2. 
162. VA. CODE § § 18.2-98.1 (1982). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Baldwin 1984). 
163. 450 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1982). 
164. Under the New York statute, a person commits theft of services when: 
[olbtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, or of business, 
commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not 
entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit 
for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such 
labor, equipment or facilities. 
N. Y. Penal Law § 165.15(8) (McKinney 1984). 
165. 450 N.Y.S.2d. at 959. 
166. [d. at 960-61. The court also held that the computer was not commercial equipment because it 
was owned by the New York Board of Education. [d. at 958-9. 
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been successfully prosecuted under the federal mail fraud statute. 167 In United 
States v. Kelly,l68 the defendants used their employer's computer to develop 
software for a personal business venture. 169 The court held that the defendants' 
use of computer time for personal benefit deprived the employer of honest and 
faithful services, and thus was a scheme to defraud within the meaning of the 
statute. 170 
For the theft of computer time from a government computer, the legislative 
history of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act suggests the use of administrative 
sanctions. 171 Prior to enactment of the Act, federal prosecutors had used the 
larceny statute l72 to prosecute the theft of computer time,l73 as a thing of value 
belonging to the federal government. l74 In United States v. May,'75 the court 
adopted this use of the larceny statute to prosecute unauthorized personal use of 
government aircraft. '76 The May court specifically rejected the argument that 
existing administrative sanctions precluded criminal sanctions, 177 and noted that 
Title 18 was not enacted to reconcile overlapping administrative and criminal 
remedies. 178 
For the questionable criminal status of the theft of computer time under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the existence of administrative sanctions 
should not preclude prosecution under the federal larceny statute. Prosecution 
of the theft of computer time under the federal larceny statute may also encour-
age state legislators and judges to broaden the definition of property within state 
larceny statutes. 179 
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). 
168. 507 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
169. ld. at 496-97. 
170. ld. at 501. The court held that essence of the fraud was the loss to the employer of the 
employee's "undivided loyalty in job performance" while in pursuit of concealed financial gain. [d. 
ld. 
171. House Report, supra note 4, at 22. 
172. 18 U.s.c. § 641 (1982) provides: 
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or 
without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of 
the United States or of any department or agency thereof ... [slhall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does 
not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more 
than one year, or both. 
173. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sampson, 6 COMPUTER L. SERVo REP. (Callahan) 879 (N. D. Cal. 1978). 
174. ld. at 880. The Sampson court held that unauthorized use of over 190 hours of government 
computer time and use of storage facilities constituted "things of value" under the federal larceny 
statute. [d. 
175. 625 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1980). 
176. [d. at 190-92. The May court reversed the convictions and remanded on other grounds. [d. at 
195. 
177. [d. at 189. 
178. [d. 
179. For example, in the 1984 case of United States V. Croft, 750 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1984), the court 
reaffirmed the use of the federal larceny statute, 18 U.s.C. § 641, for the Iheft of personal services.ld. 
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4. Computer Data and Programs as "Property" 
Most computer-related crimes are, in essence, offenses against intangible 
property, such as computer data or programs. These crimes are difficult to 
prosecute under traditional statutes because "property" is often defined only as 
real or personal property.IHO The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act circumvents 
this problem by making the act of unauthorized access the criminal offense. In 
effect, however, the Act creates a right of protection for specified kinds of 
information. lSI This approach could result in an increasing miscellany of new 
statutes, each aimed at protecting a specified class of information. 182 Rather than 
enacting more computer crime laws to protect specified information, criminal 
law could be simplified by including certain forms of intangible property within 
the definition of property in existing statutes. IH3 
Several states have already amended their theft statutes to include intangible 
property. 184 Recently in Virginia, the Supreme court in Evans v. Commonwealth Itl5 
affirmed an embezzlement conviction for the theft of stored data. At the federal 
level, information contained in government computer files has been held to be 
within the definition of property in the larceny statute. l86 In United States v. 
Girard, 187 the defendants copied and subsequently sold information contained in 
the computer files of the Drug Enforcement Agency.l88 Finding a property 
interest in the content of private records, the court stated that the definition of 
larceny included the "misuse or abuse of property" or its use "in an unauthorized 
manner,"189 and affirmed the defendants' convictions. loo 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Dumbauld argued that the statutory expansion should have been 
accomplished through legislative efforts. !d. at 1367-68. 
180. House Report, supra note 4, at 9. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 2-2-10(q) which defines "personal 
property" as including "goods, chattels, real and personal, money, credits, investments and the evi-
dences thereof .... " Id. 
181. At present, coverage under the Act extends to financial, credit, and government owned infor-
mation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(I)-(3) (West Supp. 1985).182. The 99th Congress is presently consider-
ing a computer crime bill penalizing unauthorized access to medical records. See supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
183. Professor Raymond August argues that defining property to include intangible property would 
both simplify the theory of criminal law and free the courts to focus on the injury to the victim. August, 
Turning the Computer Into a Criminal, 10 BARRISTER 12, 15 (1983). The Model Penal Code has 
included intangible property in its definition of property. MODEL PENAl. CODE AND COMMENTARIES §. 
223.0(6) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
184. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 266, § 30 (West 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1 (1982). The 
Virginia statute provides that "[c]omputer time or services or data processing services or information or 
data stored in connection therewith is hereby defined to be property which may be the subject of larceny 
.... " Id. 
185. 226 Va. 292 (1983). 
186. United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979). 
187. fd. 
188. Id. at 70. 
189. Id. at 71. 
190. fd. at 73. 
1985] COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME 569 
5. Prosecuting Computer-Related Crime Under U.S. Laws 
For crimes involving computers, it appears that a conviction is not dependent 
only on the adequacy of existing laws, but on the prosecutor's proper classifica-
tion of the crime. Prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is 
based on the premise that computer use itself, for specific unauthorized or 
criminal purposes, should be a criminal activity. In most cases, however, prosecu-
tion based on the results of the computer-related activity, such as fraud or theft, 
is more appropriate. 
For example, in a hypothetical computer-related crime, the defendant, with-
out authorization, uses a government-owned account password to access a pri-
vate university computer for his own use. 191 The U.S. government is subse-
quently billed for the computer time that the defendant used. For the pro-
secutors, the choice of an applicable statute depends on their characterization of 
the crime. 
If the prosecution characterizes the crime as a theft of government-owned 
property, they could seek a conviction under the federal larceny statute,192 for 
conversion of the account password. At least one court has held that information 
in computer files is a "thing of value" under the statute. 193 It is reasonable to 
assume that a court would also find that an account password, stored within the 
computer, is information. 
Alternatively, prosecutors could proceed under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, based not on the unlawful conversion, but on unauthorized access to 
information in a government computer. 194 While prosecution under the federal 
larceny statute goes to the nature of the underlying crime, prosecution under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act depends on whether a government computer is 
involved. 195 
If the account password had been taken from a computer other than a 
government computer, there would be no basis for prosecution under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 196 Earlier versions of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act did contain provisions which included unauthorized access to any 
public or private computer system. 197 As enacted, however, the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act covers only unauthorized access to computers operated by the 
federal government and by financial institutions.198 More specific federal crimi-
191. These facts are adapted from the Canadian case of Regina v. Marine Resource Analysts. See 
supra text accompanying notes 53-59. 
192. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982), sufna note 167. 
193. U.S. v. Girard, 601 F.2d at 71. See sufna text accompanying notes 187-90. 
194. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
195. In Marine Resource Analysts, the defendant was found guilty of fraud, not unauthorized access. 
See sUfna notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
196. See sUfna text accompanying notes 129-34. 
197. House Report, sufna note 4, at 2-3. 
198. In essence, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985) covers information stored in banks and 
credit bureaus. 
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nallegislation could be enacted to protect private computer systems. An alterna-
tive to penal sanctions, however, may provide a more comprehensive model for 
preventing all computer-related crime. 
IV. PREVENTING COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME 
"Laws act after crimes have been committed; prevention goes before them 
both." - J.G. Zimmerman 
A major objective of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was to discourage 
incidents of external access by hackers to government com puters. 199 A large 
proportion of computer-related crime, however, is perpetrated by inside em-
ployees with easy access to a computer.200 The inadequacy or nonexistence of 
internal security controls for computer systems only enhances the opportunities 
to commit computer-related crime.201 Although criminal legislation can deter 
crime to some extent through the creation of sanctions, its efficacy is decreased 
when, in effect, the safe is left unlocked. 
The Small Business Computer Security and Education Act of 1984 (Computer 
Security and Education Act)202 was enacted to improve the management of 
information technology within small businesses,203 and to educate and encourage 
those businesses in the use of computer security techniques.204 The Act focuses 
on the prevention of computer-related crime through the protection of informa-
tion.205 
The major provision of the Act establishes a Computer Security and Education 
Advisory CounciFo6 whose function is to advise the Small Business Administra-
tion on the nature and scope of computer crime, the effectiveness of state and 
federal legislation on deterrence and prosecution, the effectiveness of manage-
ment techniques to improve computer security, and the development of guide-
199. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
200. Hearings on H.R. 3970, supra note 23, at 46 (testimony of D. Parker). 
201. A recent survey conducted by the Diebold Group, Inc. indicates that the problem of inadequate 
computer security is widespread. 156 J. ACCT. 28-29 (1983). 25 percent of the companies surveyed had 
no formal security controls for data; 66 percent of the remaining companies had inadequate security 
systems. Id.202. 15 U.S.C.A. § § 633(b)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 36. 
203. Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to computer-related crimes hecause they have fewer 
resources available for system security or security audits. 130 CONC. REC. S6522 (daily ed. May 24, 
1984). 
204. S.REP. No. 438, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. 
205. Id. at 7-9. The Report cites Sanford Sherizen's "rules of business" for the computer age: 
I) Computer security is no longer an optional decision but may be fundamental to the survival 
of a business; 2) The core issues of computer security can and must be understood by 
nontechnical managers; 3) The essence of computer security lies with management controls, 
reviews and policies developed with the active support and involvement of top management; 
and 4) There are a variety of management questions which can be raised with technical staffs in 
order to evaluate the adequacy of computer protections in business. 
Id. at 7. 
206. 15 U.S.C.A. § 633(b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1985). 
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lines for evaluating system security.207 The Small Business Administration, in 
turn, disseminates this information to small businesses through forums and 
training sessions.208 
Although the Computer Security and Education Act focuses on protection for 
small businesses, the issues addressed in the Act are also relevant to large 
businesses and government.209 Many computer-related crimes, even when dis-
covered, may go unreported for fear of loss of business reputation or public 
confidence.210 This only emphasizes the need to improve computer system secu-
rity to effectively prevent computer-related crime. 
Education in computer security techniques also facilitates the investigation of 
computer-related crimes. Since 1976, the FBI has run training courses which 
familiarize students with computer operations and programming.2il As part of 
this training, students access a data base of simulated financial records, identify-
ing the methods of obtaining money through a computer.212 In California, 
private computer industry experts lead similar training programs for local law 
enforcement officials.213 These efforts should be encouraged to improve the 
detection and prevention of computer-related crimes. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Before enacting more computer crime laws, legislators should evaluate the 
interplay between the importance of computer system security and the status of 
information within the definition of property. The new Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, for example, makes it a crime to enter the computer/"safe" when it is 
still unclear whether the information/"goods" can be stolen. 
The categorization of computer information as a "thing of value" under the 
U.S. larceny statute214 should serve as a prototype for the prosecution of theft of 
computer data and programs. This approach was followed by the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in the Canadian case of Regina v. Stewart,215 which held that confiden-
207. 15 U.S.C.A. § 633(b)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1985). 
208. 15 U.S.C.A. § 633(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1985). 
209. For example, the General Accounting Office recently published a report criticizing the lack of 
security in federal computer systems. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
REMAIN HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO FRAUDULENT, WASTEFUL, ABUSIVE, AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES, Masad-
82-18 (April 21,1982). 
210. See Sokolik, supra note 2, at 359. This is particularly true for financial institutions. See also 
Hearing on H.R. 3970, supra note 14, at 72. 
211. Hearings on 3970, supra note 23, at 9. 
212. Jd. See also Crim. Just. Newsletter, Apr. 25, 1983, at 6 col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Newsletter]. 
. 213. This project is a joint effort of the local law enforcement agencies, the California Department of 
Justice, and the FBI. Newsletter, supra note I32b. The computer crime unit is headed by District 
Attorney Leo Himmelsbach of Santa Clara County, California.ld. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 186-90. 
215. 42 Ont. 2d 225 (1983). 
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tial information stored in a computer was subject to theft.216 The Stewart court 
specifically rejected the English case Oxford v. Moss,217 and instead cited with 
approval several U.S. cases holding that information was within the definition of 
property. 218 
In England, the seemingly contrary holding in Oxford v. Moss219 need not 
preclude application of the Theft Act to theft of computer information. Oxford v. 
Moss could be interpreted as indicating that the memorization of information, in 
itself, does not constitute theft. Such an interpretation would be consistent with 
both Canadian and U.S. cases, and allow for the prosecution of theft of com-
puter information without resort to specific computer crime legislation. 
Canada has also extended its interpretation of information as property to 
crimes involving the alteration of computer data. In Turner and the Queen,220 this 
was accomplished through the use of the mischief statute, which prohibits 
interference with the use of property.221 In England, the questionable status of 
information as property might preclude prosecution of the alteration of com-
puter data. The Theft Act, however, has been applied to schemes involving the 
alteration of data where the underlying crime resulted in a fraud or theft. 222 
In the United States, the federal mischief statute223, requires a physical depre-
dation against property.224 This requirement effectively prevents federal pro-
secutors from using the mischief statute to prosecute for alteration of informa-
tion in computer files. If the Canadian approach is adopted in the United States, 
the federal mischief statute should be amended to include any interference with 
government property.225 As with the U.S. federal larceny statute, prosecutors 
216. [d. at 240. 
217. 68 Crim. App. 183 (1979). See supra text acconipanying notes 84-86. 
218. 42 Ont. 2d at 239, 241-42. 
219. 68 Crim. App. 183 (1979). The Oxford court held that confidential information was not within 
the definition of property for purposes of the Theft Act 1968. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. 
220. 13 C.C.C. 3d 430 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 71-83. 
221. See supra note 74. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 90-98. 
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). The statute provides: 
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property of the United 
States, or any department or agency thereof, or any property which has been or is being 
manufactured or constructed for the United States, or any department or agency thereof, shall 
be punished as follows: 
[d. 
If the damage to such property exceeds the sum of$100, by a fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; if the damage to such property does not 
exceed the sum of $100, by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more 
than one year, or both. 
224. The court in United States v.Jenkins defined depredation as the acts of plundering, robbing or 
pillaging. 554 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1977). 
225. See supra note 74. Alternatively, federal legislators could adopt the approach of the Washington 
state mischief statute which in relevant part, provides: 
"Physical damage", in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include the total or partial 
alteration, damage, obliteration, or erasure of records, information, data, computer programs, 
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would have the choice of using either the new mischief offense or an applicable 
provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
The classification of computer services as property has allowed for successful 
prosecution of the theft of computer time or services. This approach is best 
exemplified by recent interpretations of the U.S. federal larceny statute which 
have construed services as a thing of value. 226 Criminal statutes which specifically 
prohibit the theft of services, as in section 1 of the English Theft Act 1978,227 are 
often inapplicable to computer services due to requirements that the services be 
provided in expectation of payment. 22M For prosecution of this crime in the 
United States, the expanded use of larceny statutes may be the only method 
available, because the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act exempts the theft of 
computer time from coverage. 
In the United States, the relationship between information and property often 
varies, depending primarily on an individual courts' interpretations of property 
in a given criminal statute. At the federal level, the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, in effect, creates a "property right" in owners of certain classified informa-
tion and financial data. The proliferation of criminal laws based on subject 
matter of information may be the unwelcome result of such an approach. This 
may already be occurring at the state level, where computer crime legislation 
now exists in thirty-five statesY9 Over half of these laws were either enacted or 
amended during 1984 alone. 23o 
or their computer representations, which are recorded for use in computers or the impair-
ment, interruption, or interference with the use of such records, information, data, or com-
puter programs, or the impairment, interruption, or interference with the use of any com-
puter or services provided by computers. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48.100 (1984). 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74. 
227. See supra note 100. 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104, 163-66. 
229. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.985 (1983); 1984 Alaska Legis. Servo ch. 79 (West 1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § § 13-2301, 12-2316 (1978); CAL. PENAl. CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § § 
18-5.5-101 to 102 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-250-61 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 931-39(1984); 
Fl.A. STAT. ANN. § § 815.01-815.07 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § § 16-9-90 to 16-9-95 (1984); 
HAWAII REV. STAT. § § 708-890 to 708-896 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 2201-02 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
38, § § 15-1, 16-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE § 716A.1 to 716A.16 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 
434.840-.860 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.73.1 to 14.73.5 (1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146 
(1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 266, § 30 (West 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.529 (Callaghan 1981); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 609.87-.89 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § § 569.093 to .099 (Supp. 1983); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § § 45-6-310; 45-6-311 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.§ § 205.473-205.477 (1983); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § § 30-16A-1 to -4 (Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 14-453 to 14-457 (1981); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § § 12.1-06.1-08 (1983); OKl.A. STAT. tit. 21, § § 1951-56 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3933 
(Purdon 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § § 11-52-1 to 11-52-4 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-10 to 16-16-40 
(Law. Co-op. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-43B-1 to 43-43B-8 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 
39-3-1401 to -1406 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § § 76-6-601 to -604 (1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-152.1-14 
(1984); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.48.100, 9A.52.11O-130 (1984); WIS. STAT. AN". § 943.70 (West Supp. 
1984); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-501 to -505. 
230. Supra note 229. 
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For the United States, Canada, and England, a viable alternative to the enact-
ment of computer crime statutes is the expansion of the definition of property 
within offenses to include intangible property, such as computer data. Clearly, 
more effective deterrence of computer-related crime requires a more uniform 
treatment of information as an asset under existing laws. Both the private sector 
and the legislature must work together, however, to insure that information 
receives the most effective protection possible. 
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